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Dead Hand Investing:
The Enforceability of Trust Investment Directives
Jeffrey A. Cooper, Hamden, Connecticut*
INTRODUCTION
Modern trust law must perform a delicate balancing act. On one
side of the scales is the trust settlor, whose voluntary acts created and
funded the trust1 and who American law accords great deference, even
in death.2 On the other side are the trust beneficiaries, for whose benefit the trust was created and whose interests, financial and otherwise, are
at stake in its administration. Trust law thus operates amid a timeless
battle between the dead and the living, those who have made the rules
and those who must live by them.3
This ongoing conflict becomes particularly evident when the settlor
attempts to impose a binding investment directive, such as a mandate
that a trustee retain a particular investment or pursue a particular investment philosophy. The settlor may attempt to impose such restrictions for a litany of reasons. Perhaps the settlor truly believes that his
chosen investment course will maximize beneficiaries’ wealth and protect the trust funds from falling prey to unproven investment strategies
or unqualified portfolio managers. Perhaps the settlor has imposed the
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College;
J.D., Yale Law School; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University School of Law. Academic Fellow, ACTEC. As discussed more fully infra note 10, this Article contains significant excerpts from my prior writings on this subject. While I have updated and
reworked portions of the text in an effort to maximize utility for the readers of this Journal, material portions of this Article are reprinted in their previously published form.
1 A trust is an arrangement for the ownership of property involving three parties
(or sets of parties): a “settlor” or “grantor” who conveys property to a “trustee” to be
used for the benefit of one or more third party “beneficiaries.” While trusts can take a
variety of forms, this Article focuses on irrevocable private trusts, viz those trusts established for specified individual beneficiaries by a settlor who retains no power to alter or
amend the trust”). For a more detailed introduction to the basics of trust law, discussing
the historical background and uses of private trusts, see JESSIE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H.
SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 541-557 (8th ed. 2009).
2 For a detailed discussion of the ways in which American law honors the wishes of
deceased individuals, see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING
POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010).
3 While in many cases the settlor of an irroveocable trust will not be “dead” in a
biological sense, she is functionally dead for legal purposes insofar as she lacks legal
standing to amend the trust or impact its administration.
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restriction as a means of perpetuating her own moral or religious beliefs.
Or perhaps the settlor’s motivation isn’t nearly so noble. Indeed, the
settlor may have imposed the restriction out of unadulterated
egomania—the settlor’s last effort to impose his will upon succeeding
generations, cheating his own mortality by continuing to rule his descendants from the grave. Regardless of the settlor’s motives, the trust
beneficiaries may quickly come to view any settlor-imposed investment
restrictions as inefficient and burdensome—economic shackles which
unduly limit the trustees’ ability to pursue the investment course that
best serves the living beneficiaries and that is best suited to maximize
those beneficiaries’ wealth.
Trust beneficiaries seeking to set aside such settlor-imposed investment restrictions may have a new statutory tool to assist in these efforts.
Section 105(b)(3) of the Uniform Trust Code (hereinafter the “UTC”)4
now codifies an unwaivable requirement that a “trust and its terms must
be for the benefit of its beneficiaries” (hereinafter the “benefit-the-beneficiaries rule”).5 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts contains similar
language.6 Beneficiaries seeking to free themselves of investment restrictions now can point to these sources of authority and argue that
settlor-imposed investment restrictions serve solely the dead settlor’s interests and not the living beneficiaries’ ones. Accordingly, goes the argument, those restrictions should be set aside.
Whether this is a correct interpretation of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is an open question. Whether it’s a desirable interpretation
is equally in dispute. The scholarly literature reflects a growing controversy surrounding these open questions, including a number of recent
law review articles setting out opposing viewpoints on the subject.7 I
have authored two of these works while Professor John Langbein has
provided a comprehensive counterpoint. In this Article, I revisit these
prior works and restate my significant concerns about the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule’s potential impact on trust investment law. As with
my prior works, this Article is offered as guidance to judges interpreting
4 The UTC represents “the first national codification of the law of trusts.” UNIF.
TRUST CODE prefatory note (2005). Twenty-three states plus the District of Columbia
have adopted the UTC. Legislative Fact Sheet - Trust Code, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?
title=Trust%20Code (last visited June 9, 2012).
5 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is codified as section 404 of the UTC, which
directs that “[a] trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.” UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 404. Per UTC § 105(b)(3), the settlor cannot alter this mandatory rule.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (2003) (providing in relevant part that
“a private trust, its terms, and its administration must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries.”).
7 See infra notes 8, 10, 19 and accompanying text.
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the UTC and the Restatement and state legislators considering adoption
– or modification – of state trust law. More importantly, however, this
Article is intended to set out for trust settlors, beneficiaries, and their
counsel the potentially significant practical implications of this ongoing
academic debate.
This Article consists of three parts. In Part I, I recap the scholarly
debate thus far, summarizing both my concerns relating to the benefitthe-beneficiaries rule and Professor Langbein’s countervailing views. In
Part II, I revisit my primary thesis, namely that the emerging rule is
overbroad in its impact and would have numerous undesirable, likely
unintended, effects. In Part III, I contend that the rule is counterproductive. I illustrate how trust settlors and their counsel likely would
seek to avoid this emerging rule through means that would serve only to
exacerbate current concerns about dead hand control of trust
investments.
I. SUMMARY

OF THE

LITERATURE

My scholarly discourse with Professor Langbein regarding the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule was sparked by a 2004 essay in which he discussed the growing impact of mandatory rules of trust law, a noteworthy
trend in a field traditionally devoted to the effectuation of settlors’ intent and regulated by merely default rules of law.8 In that essay, Professor Langbein seemingly predicted that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule
would serve to reshape trust investment law by limiting trust settlors’
traditional ability to mandate specific investment guidelines for the
trusts they established. Whereas trust law traditionally invalidated only
those investment restrictions that “crackpot” settlors imposed, Professor
Langbein predicted that such occurrences would become “more
common.”9
In a 2008 Article in the Boston University Law Review, I voiced
three major reservations about this prediction.10 First, I contended that
this interpretation required a distorted reading of the UTC’s text and
Comments, which repeatedly cast the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule as a
8 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105
(2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules].
9 Id. at 1111. (“The characteristic sphere for the application of the anti-dead-hand
rule has been the fringe world of the eccentric settlor: the crackpot who wants to brick up
her house, or build statues of himself, or dictate children’s marital choices. In the future,
however, I believe that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule will set limits upon a more common form of settlor direction, the value-impairing investment instruction.”)
10 Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and
the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166-70 (2008) [hereinafter
Cooper, Empty Promises]. Significant portions of this Article are excerpted from this
prior work.
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mere linguistic update rather than a significant departure from prior
law.11 Second, I illustrated how an expansive reading of the new rule
could have unintended, overbroad consequences – interfering with the
traditional role of trustee, undermining well-established estate planning
techniques, and spawning meritless litigation.12 Third, I argued that
even if the drafters of the UTC did intend to modify trust law in this
manner, they could not successfully do so. Rather, interstate competition to attract trust business and creative lawyering to avoid undesirable
trust law would allow settlors to outflank the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule.13 As a result, to the extent the UTC and the Restatement promised to inspire uniform mandatory rules of trust investment law, those
promises ultimately would prove to be empty ones.
In early 2010, Professor Langbein published a reply to my 2008 Article in which he challenged both my interpretation of the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule and my concerns about its impact on trust investment
law.14 In his essay, Professor Langbein repeatedly sought to reassure
that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is not “the radical and worrisome
innovation that Cooper paints it to be,”15 but rather “a modest and
helpful clarification”16 of existing trust law. Characterizing my concerns about the rule’s potentially overbroad impact as “conjectural and
unsound,”17 he instead insisted that the rule is so limited in scope that it
will never “play any serious role in trust practice.”18 In sum, Professor
Langbein contended that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is but an incremental reform and that my grave reservations about its potential impact are simply unfounded.
While Professor Langbein’s above-quoted passages suggested that
we may have reached a middle ground, other portions of his 2010 essay
suggested otherwise. Accordingly, in late 2010, I published a follow-up
essay in the Boston University Law Review in which I explored what I
perceived to be a continuing disconnect between Professor Langbein’s

11

Id. at 1178-79.
Id. at 1182-1201.
13 Id. at 1201-09.
14 John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?: Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s
Power to Direct Trust Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2010) [hereinafter
Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?].
15 Id. at 396.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 397.
18 Id. Cf. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1111. (“In the future, however, I believe that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule will set limits upon a more common
form of settlor direction, the value-impairing investment instruction.”).
12
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characterization of the rule and its true practical effect.19 First, I traced
the historical origins of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule and illustrated
how this rule departs from other sources of trust law far more significantly than Professor Langbein’s writings have acknowledged.20 Second, I considered the rule’s potential application to a series of
hypothetical trust investment directives, illustrating how Professor
Langbein’s proffered reading of the rule could cast a far greater shadow
on trust investment law than his writings have conceded.21
Taken as a series, these articles outline two opposing views of the
future of trust investment law. Professor Langbein casts the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule as an incremental, economically-efficient, improvement which enables trustees to serve the investment needs of beneficiaries unburdened by the foolish dictates of now-dead settlors. While
not directly challenging the wisdom of this goal, my writings contend
that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule simply will fail to achieve it.22
Trust settlors and their sage counsel simply will not yield to the benefitthe-beneficiaries regime. Its enactment will prove self-defeating, as settlors outflank this emerging rule by moving trust dollars to more settlorfriendly jurisdictions and drafting trust documents to further restrict the
rights of trust beneficiaries. Dead hands will not so easily yield their
power.
II. POTENTIAL UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES
Expansive use of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule to invalidate
trust investment directives would produce a variety of undesirable consequences, undermining well-established principles of current trust law
and frustrating key aspects of modern estate planning. In this Part, I
analyze six such potential consequences.
A. Undermines an Established Statutory Scheme
Reading the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule to invalidate settlor-imposed investment directives would offend a plain reading of widelyadopted trust investment statutes and undermine a well-established legal regime.
19

Jeffrey A. Cooper, Shades of Gray: Applying the Benefit-the-Beneficiaries Rule to
Trust Investment Directives, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2383 (2010) [hereinafter Cooper, Shades of
Gray].
20 Id. at 2386-95.
21 Id. at 2395-2400.
22 In the name of simplicity, I oversimplify my own position here. More precisely, I
contend that a supposedly mandatory rule of intent-defeating state law, imposed by some
jurisdictions and not others, is not an effective practical means of “forcing” trust settlors
to relinquish dead hand control.
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The First Victim: The UTC Itself

In contrast to previous codifications of trust law, which scattered
fragments of governing authority across various statutes, the UTC is intended to provide a comprehensive, easily accessible source of law.23 If
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule provides a new basis for invalidating
settlor-imposed investment directives, then the UTC fails to achieve
these laudable goals.
A plain reading of the UTC’s text and Comments suggest that its
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule serves to reiterate, rather than revolutionize, established trust law. Indeed, the actual text of the UTC, mandating
that “[a] trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries,”24 merely echoes traditional principles of fiduciary law.25 The
relevant Comments are equally disarming, clarifying both that the trustee’s obligation towards the trust beneficiaries is to “benefit those beneficiaries in accordance with their interests as defined in the trust’s
terms,”26 and that the settlor “has considerable latitude in specifying
how a particular trust purpose is to be pursued.”27 All the UTC facially
requires is that the trust terms “reasonably relate” to the trust purposes
and do not deploy trust funds towards “frivolous or capricious” ends.28
Taken together, these provisions appear to do nothing more than reiterate traditional public policy restrictions on a settlor’s power.29
In addition to suggesting that the UTC leaves unchanged the settlor’s traditional authority to define general trust terms, the drafters affirmatively state that the UTC is of particularly limited applicability in
the specialized area of trust investment law. Specifically, neither section
105(b)(3) nor any of the other mandatory rules in section 105(b) even
reference article 9 of the UTC, the article specifically related to trust
23

UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note (2005).
Id. § 404.
25 The notion that a trust exists to benefit the beneficiaries hardly appears to be a
revolutionary contribution to trust law. See Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at
1171.
26 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (emphasis added). While comments to uniform
acts are not binding authority, they do offer insight into the drafters’ rationale, thus effectively “reflecting the legislative intent of enacting states.” Edward C. Halbach, Jr. &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB.
L. REV. 1091, 1103 n.49 (1992).
27 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2)
(tent. Drft. No. 2, approved 1999)) (emphasis added).
28 Id.
29 Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at 1171 (indicating that courts traditionally honor settlor’s intent while noting exceptions where courts invalidated trust provisions that “encouraged illegal activity, fostered immorality, or otherwise violated public
policy”).
24
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investments.30 To the contrary, the UTC’s explicit approach to trust
investment law is to defer31 to the provisions of the widely-adopted Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”).32 States that previously have
adopted the UPIA are encouraged to recodify their existing UPIA as
article 9 of the UTC,33 while the remaining states are invited to enact
the UPIA under the UTC’s umbrella.34 This deference to the existing
UPIA thus represents another manner in which the UTC facially reaffirms established trust law rather than fundamentally altering it.
Taken together, these numerous provisions of the UTC seemingly
grant a trust settlor the widest possible discretion35 to define the nature
of the beneficiaries’ interests in a trust and to draft investment management guidelines that the settlor believes will serve those interests. An
expansive application of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule to trust investment directives would directly override the plain language of these
provisions and defy their innocuous tone. This approach would render
the UTC a fundamentally incomprehensible piece of trust legislation,
requiring a reader seeking to understand the UTC’s meaning to look to
the pages of law reviews rather than the UTC’s own text and Comments. If this is the unwieldy end result, then the UTC would have
failed to achieve its own goals of clarity and accessibility.
2. The Second Victim: The UPIA
As discussed above, the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule
would create significant disharmony within the UTC. It also would generate unacceptable conflicts between the UTC and the UPIA, stealthily
subsuming the latter Act’s fundamental purpose and well-established
default posture.
In order to understand the nature of the UPIA, one must first understand the prevailing theory of investment management – modern
30 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 9 (2005) (incorporating the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act as article 9 of the UTC).
31 David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and
Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2002) (“Given its importance and already widespread acceptance, the UTC does not modify the smaller Uniform Prudent Investor Act
but incorporates it without change.”).
32 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994). Forty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the UPIA. Legislative Fact Sheet – Prudent
Investor Act, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, http://www.
uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last visited June 9, 2012).
33 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 9 cmt.
34 See id. prefatory note (stating that article 9 “provides a place for a jurisdiction to
enact, reenact or codify its version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.”).
35 The settlor’s power is subject, of course, to traditional public policy limitations.
See supra note 29.
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portfolio theory.36 Shaped by decades of investment management research, modern portfolio theory provides compelling academic support
for the notion that certain investment actions, such as adequately diversifying portfolios, avoiding speculation, and minimizing investment
costs, are per se prudent.37 Six Nobel laureates have been recognized
for their work related to modern portfolio theory,38 and the UPIA incorporates the principles of modern portfolio theory.39
However, despite the compelling logic of modern portfolio theory,
the UPIA allows individual settlors to reject it. By its own terms, the
UPIA is a pure default statute, providing rules that “may be expanded,
restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a
trust.”40 If the UTC now adds an additional, unwaivable requirement
that a settlor’s exercise of this expansive discretion must objectively
benefit the beneficiaries, then the UTC completely overrides the default
posture of the UPIA.
The issue of portfolio diversification provides a clear example of
the confusion the emerging rule would create. Under the UPIA, a trustee is directed to diversify a portfolio rather than concentrate investment risk in a small number of trust investments.41 This general rule is
subject to two major exceptions. First, the trustee is authorized to depart from the general rule whenever “the trustee reasonably determines
that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying.”42 Second, the requirement of diversification, like all provisions of the UPIA, is merely a default rule which the
settlor may reject.43 The emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule seemingly would add a major restriction to this second exception, allowing a
settlor to negate the default duty to diversify only when doing so benefits the beneficiaries.
36

Modern portfolio theory originated with the work of Harry Markowitz. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). For a brief overview of
modern portfolio theory, see Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act – An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME.
L. REV. 27, 33-38 (1999); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained
Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 73 n.90 (1987) (cataloging literature related to
modern portfolio theory). For a more detailed guide to modern portfolio theory, see W.
SCOTT SIMON, THE PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING 35-59
(Namborn Pub. Co. 2002).
37 SIMON, supra note 36, at 35-59.
38 See Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 14, at 388 n.99 (listing Nobel
laureates).
39 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT prefatory note (1994).
40 Id. § 1(b).
41 Id. § 3.
42 Id.
43 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

Winter 2011]

DEAD HAND INVESTING

373

This additional restriction completely undermines the structure of
the UPIA. As noted above, the UPIA already authorizes a trustee to
retain an undiversified portfolio when doing so would “better serve” the
beneficiaries.44 Therefore, the UPIA’s additional verbiage unilaterally
empowering the settlor to negate default investment rules has meaning
only if it enables the settlor to mandate an undiversified portfolio even
when the beneficiaries would be better served by diversifying. If the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule effectively would deny the settlor that
power, it would convert the previously default duty to diversify into a
mandatory one that the “circumstances” can excuse, but which the settlor cannot abrogate. That reading would undermine the UPIA’s fundamental structure and would offend clear principles of statutory
interpretation by rendering superfluous a portion of its text.45
Professor Langbein repeatedly argues against such an inflexible
reading of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, but a detailed review of his
analysis serves only to exacerbate my concerns. In his 2004 Article, for
example, Langbein concedes that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule
would prevent an irrational settlor from flouting modern portfolio theory by waiving the UPIA’s default provisions mandating diversification,
but would allow a more thoughtful settlor truly seeking to benefit the
beneficiaries to waive such provisions.46 For example, Langbein suggests that either tax considerations or a desire to retain a family business
might justify a settlor’s decision to depart from the default rule.47 These
two potential exceptions are nothing new. In fact, they appear in the
comments to the UPIA itself as exemplifying the type of “circumstances” which negate the trustee’s default duty to diversify even in the
absence of any directive from the settlor.48 But what of the separate
prong of the UPIA which allows a settlor to negate this default regime?49 Professor Langbein appeared to have ignored it.
In his 2010 essay, Professor Langbein again criticized my concerns
as being the product of “an extreme textualist interpretation” of the interplay between the UTC and the UPIA.50 However, in that same essay, Professor Langbein validated my concerns by making explicit the
extent to which his reading of the UTC and UPIA does undermine the
44

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
46 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1111.
47 See id. at 1115.
48 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 cmt. (1994).
49 Id. § 1(b).
50 Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 14, at 391.
45
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settlor’s ability to negate the default rule in favor of diversification.
Specifically, Professor Langbein contended that “[t]he duty to diversify
remains default law, which the UPIA authorizes the settlor to abridge in
those ‘special circumstances, [in which] the purposes of the trust are better served without diversifying.’”51 Twice elsewhere in his essay, he offered largely similar formulations.52 Professor Langbein’s approach
thus effectively melds the UPIA’s two separate prongs into one, authorizing the settlor to trump the default duty to diversify only when “special circumstances” already made that duty inapplicable in the first
place. As I had previously suggested it might,53 Professor Langbein’s
formulation of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule effectively holds the
settlor to the same standard as a trustee. Default notions of prudence
trump the settlor’s power to define trust terms. Trust law’s traditional
deference to settlor’s intent, and UPIA section 1(b),54 are seemingly
given no voice in this new regime.
This formulation of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would undermine the UPIA’s established regime in areas extending well beyond
questions of investment diversification. The UPIA defines all of a trustee’s obligations by subjective reference to the settlor’s expectations and
the terms of the governing trust document.55 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule seemingly takes the opposite approach, allowing objective
notions of prudence to circumscribe a settlor’s chosen trust terms. The
two approaches simply cannot be reconciled. Despite assertions to the
contrary, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would completely undermine
the UPIA’s default nature, effectively limiting the settlor’s power to negate default notions of prudence only when it is prudent to do so. A
power to be imprudent only when prudent is no power at all.
In sum, the UTC is offered as a clear and comprehensible statute
which facially defers to the UPIA’s existing statutory framework for investment of trust funds. If the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule provides an
51

Id. (quoting UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3).
See Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 14, at 390. (“Like the rest of
trust investment law, the duty to diversify is a default rule. The UPIA permits a trustee to
decide not to diversify but only for good reason . . . .”); see Id. at 393 (“The duty to
diversify has remained a default rule in the prudent investor reforms, because, despite the
advantages of diversification, there are various circumstances in which a prudent fiduciary may conclude that other considerations outweigh diversification.”).
53 See Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at 1181. (“Despite [Professor
Langbein’s] assertions to the contrary, the emerging rule would completely undermine
the UPIA’s default nature, effectively limiting the grantor’s power to negate default notions of prudence to those cases where it is objectively prudent to do so.”).
54 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1(b) (1994) (providing that default provisions
of the UPIA “may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust).”
55 See id. § 2 cmt.
52
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overriding objective standard for the enforceability of trust investment
provisions, then the impact of the UTC is exactly the opposite of everything it claims to be: it fundamentally overrides one of the central provisions of the UPIA and does so in a cryptic, convoluted, manner.
B. Alters the Fiduciary Relationship
A second undesirable consequence of the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule is that it would fundamentally alter the trustee’s traditional posture
in trust administration matters. A trustee no longer would be interpreter and enforcer of the settlor’s directives. Rather, he would become
a skeptical challenger, constantly questioning the very source of authority under which he is empowered to act. This shift in roles would spawn
three predictable negative effects.
First, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would weaken a fundamental pillar of trust law by undermining its traditional contractarian principles. In significant part, a trust document is understood to reflect a
contract, “a deal, between settlor and trustee, about how the trustee will
manage and apply the trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”56
This contractarian approach encourages settlors to embrace trust law by
offering them greater ability to bind a trustee to follow their stated
wishes.57 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule undermines such contractarian principles, as the trustee increasingly becomes obligated to
ignore the “deal” he entered into whenever doing so would serve the
objective needs of the trust beneficiaries. The change makes trust law
less attractive to trust settlors and can be expected to have a chilling
impact on the establishment of trusts.
For those who nevertheless proceed to establish trusts, this fundamental shift in trust law would have a second, very practical, effect: it
will increase the cost of administering those trusts. The job responsibilities of trustees will markedly increase if trustees now must undertake a
new obligation of evaluating the economic effect, and thus the enforceability, of every trust provision. To fulfill these new responsibilities,
trustees would incur increased compliance and administrative costs – ex56 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 652 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis]. Professor Langbein’s approach departed from the previously established view of trusts as primarily proprietarian
in nature. For a detailed discussion of these two competing viewpoints of the nature of a
trust, see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 627-33 (2004).
57 See T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1618-19
(2007) (contrasting a contractual approach, which gives settlors “maximum flexibility to
structure the terms of the bargain with the trustee,” with a proprietarian one, which is
more likely to “impinge upon the wishes of the settlor in order to protect the property
rights held by the beneficiary”).
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penses which predictably would result either in increased fees for fiduciary services or a reduction in the number of potential fiduciaries willing
to serve in that capacity.58
In addition, this change would result in higher legal fees for routine
trust administration. Typically, the lawyer who drafts a trust document
also represents the trustee seeking to interpret that document.59 This
approach is not only efficient, requiring just one lawyer to serve both
settlor and fiduciary, but it also likely fosters better results by providing
the trustee unfettered access to the attorney-draftsman. However, if the
modern regime increasingly requires that a trustee further the beneficiaries’ interests despite the settlor’s intent, it becomes ethically problematic for the attorney who represented a settlor in the drafting of a
trust to also represent the trustee in administration of that trust.60 Suddenly, we need, and must compensate, twice as many trust lawyers.61
In sum, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule alters established notions
of the relationship between settlors and trustees, requiring those parties
58 See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 56, at 657 (suggesting that many
trustees willingly accept fiduciary roles because “compliance with trust fiduciary law is
ordinarily not onerous”).
59 Joel C. Dobris, Ethical Problems for Lawyers upon Trust Terminations: Conflicts
of Interest, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). Going one step further, in many cases the
draftsman actually serves as the trustee. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-426 (2002) (concluding that a lawyer may act as both draftsman and
trustee when the client has made an “informed decision” to employ the lawyer in this
dual role). For a criticism of this practice, see Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of Ethics
Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testamentary Fiduciary, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 275, 309
(1988) (advocating that ethical rules be modified to bar the practice). But see Bradley R.
Cook, New Developments Alter the Role of Estate Planners in Recommending Fiduciaries,
16 EST. PLAN. 356, 356 (1989) (arguing that overly-strict ethical rules will put lawyers at a
competitive disadvantage relative to banks and trust companies); Paula A. Monopoli,
Drafting Attorneys as Fiduciaries: Fashioning an Optimal Ethical Rule for Conflicts of
Interest, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 438 (2005) (contending that barring attorneys from
acting as trustees would create a shortage of “well-trained fiduciaries”).
60 The increased risk of conflicts between settlor and trustee might prohibit an attorney from representing both parties. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2)
(1983) (prohibiting representation of a client where “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person”). Even before the emerging
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule complicated the landscape, Professor Pennell called the
ethical issues surrounding the representation of fiduciaries “as confused and distressing
as any to be found anywhere in the estate planning practice.” Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics
Issues: “You Can’t Teach Ethics,” in 35TH ANNUAL ESTATE PLANNING INSTITUTE 657,
701 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan., Course Handbook Series No. 2902, 2004). For a more
detailed exposition, see generally Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary
Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994).
61 As one who makes his living helping to train future trust lawyers, I am not necessarily opposed to the result. However, it clearly represents a more expensive approach
than the current one.
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to abandon efficient rules predicated on such notions. This realignment
of interests will produce a new regime that is both more cumbersome
and more costly than the one it seeks to replace.
C. Opens the Floodgates of Litigation
A third undesirable consequence of the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is that it could open the proverbial floodgates of trust litigation by altering the balance of power between trust settlors and trust
beneficiaries.
Even though trust law has long considered a settlor’s intent to be
the “polestar” of trust interpretation,62 settlors never have enjoyed completely unfettered ability to customize the provisions of a trust.63 For
example, a trust provision intended to further an illegal or immoral purpose typically is given no effect.64 The same is true of a trust provision
which directs the waste or destruction of trust property.65 The benefitthe-beneficiaries rule seemingly would add another category of prohibitions to this traditional list: trust provisions which are “value-impairing,”
or objectively imprudent.66
From the standpoint of trust litigation, that change could be revolutionary in two ways. First, there appears to be little demand among
trust settlors to establish trusts to engage in the type of conduct that
trust law has traditionally prohibited. There simply is no evidence that
settlors are lining up to establish trusts to run drug cartels or oversee the
wasteful destruction of property. As a result, prohibiting this conduct
does little to impact the testamentary freedom of the vast majority of
trust settlors. Second, the type of illegal and immoral trust provisions
that trust law refuses to effectuate are not only extremely rare, but they
also tend to be rather obvious.67 Together, these factors serve to temper
the volume of litigation brought by beneficiaries seeking to set aside
such provisions, minimizing the judicial resources expended on adjudicating these controversies.
Adding merely imprudent trust provisions into the mix would significantly alter these historical dynamics. Consider the example of a
provision directing that a closely-held family business started by one
62 See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Speak Clearly and Listen Well: Negating the Duty to Diversify Trust Investments, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 903, 903-04 (2007) (collecting authority).
63 See Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at 1171.
64 Id.
65 See Lior Jacob Strabilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 838 (2005).
66 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1111.
67 The law already defines illegal conduct via applicable criminal statutes, while
courts have long recognized our inherent ability to discern immoral conduct. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing hard-core pornography by saying: “I know it when I see it . . . .”).
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generation be continued for the next. Is this a provision common in
modern trusts? It is.68 Is it illegal or immoral? Certainly not.69 But is
it value-maximizing? Is it objectively prudent? Are the beneficiaries
best served by such a provision? On such questions implicated by the
emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, reasonable minds can clearly
disagree.
One can expect such uncertainty to foster significant fiduciary litigation. Trust beneficiaries often are a litigious bunch.70 The emerging
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would suddenly provide beneficiaries with
a new basis for seeking to overturn a settlor’s estate planning regime.
The question of what course of conduct would benefit the beneficiaries
will be so unclear in many cases that every trust beneficiary who wished
to do so could seemingly find a good-faith basis for litigation.
Since most beneficiaries settle their lawsuits rather than adjudicate
the merits of their claims,71 the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would provide a powerful tool for a beneficiary seeking to provoke a settlement.
The result is a potential dramatic expansion of nuisance lawsuits. This
unwelcome trend would be compounded by the fact that the propriety
of a trustee’s investment decisions is a question of fact,72 and thus a
challenge on such a basis would typically survive a motion for summary
judgment.
In sum, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would provide a powerful
new arrow in the quiver of beneficiaries seeking to extort a settlement
from a trustee unwilling to engage in protracted litigation. This result
serves neither the needs of trust settlors nor those of society generally.
68 See Henry Christensen, III & Michael L. Graham, 100 Years Is a Long Time –
New Concepts and Practical Planning Ideas, SN025 ALI-ABA 149 (2007) (suggesting that
many settlors direct the retention of closely-held assets).
69 I assume the underlying business is a legal one.
70 See Rust E. Reid et al., Privilege and Confidentiality Issues When a Lawyer Represents a Fiduciary, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 541, 600 (1996) (“[L]itigious beneficiaries anxiously await a chance to second guess both the lawyer and the fiduciary.”). Of
course, some “litigious” trust beneficiaries may have valid grievances which the law
should redress. See generally Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving Mechanisms
for Resolving Complaints of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 64
(2002) (discussing the plight of trust beneficiaries that cannot obtain the information or
access to legal services needed to protect their interests). Nevertheless, as Professor
Whitman and Mr. Paturi compellingly argue, such beneficiaries would be better served by
streamlining and facilitating alternative forms of dispute resolution rather than fostering
increased formal litigation. Id. at 72. See Charles W. Pieterse & Charles E. Coates, III,
Exculpation and Proaction, SR003 ALI-ABA 141 (2009) for a detailed discussion of the
use of exculpatory clauses as a means of protecting trustees from the specter of litigation.
71 See Steven M. Fast, Structuring Trusts to Avoid Beneficiary Dissatisfaction, SG012
ALI-ABA 29 (2001).
72 In re Estate of Janes, 630 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (Sur. Ct. 1995) (citing In re Clarke’s
Estate, 12 N.Y.2d 183, 186 (1962)).
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D. Unleashes the Tyranny of the Majority
Another unsettling consequence of the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule is that it could serve to channel all trust investments into whatever
investment management style is in vogue and prevent trust settlors from
instituting contrary investment styles.73 This not only undesirably narrows the universe of available investment options,74 but may also frustrate the goals of many trust settlors.
1.

Forced to Join the Investment Herd

Popular notions of investment management have frequently led investors to financial ruin. The stock market crashes of 192975 and 198776
both were results of euphoric public sentiment driving investment markets to unrealistic and unsustainable valuations.77 Similar examples of
this phenomenon can be found throughout world history.78 Given the
73 I do not contend that proponents of the emerging rule would favor this result.
Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed in this Section, I believe the rule would likely
have this effect.
74 This would undermine one of the fundamental goals of the UPIA, namely to
widen the available universe of trust investments. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2
cmt. (1994).
75 In 1929, a dramatic crash of the U.S. stock market presaged the Great Depression. For a history of the market decline and its aftermath, see generally JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1997). Galbraith attributes the crash in large part
to “a great speculative orgy” fueled by “a pervasive sense of confidence and optimism
and conviction that ordinary people were meant to be rich.” Id. at 169. For another
account of the economic and social causes of the Great Depression, see generally MAURY
KLEIN, RAINBOW’S END: THE CRASH OF 1929 (2001).
76 On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points, the worst
one-day percentage decline in history. Lawrence J. DeMaria, Stocks Plunge 508 Points, a
Drop of 22.6%; 604 Million Volume Nearly Doubles Record, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1987,
at A1. As was the case in 1929, the 1987 crash was a product of “a wave of reckless
speculation.” JOHN EHRMAN, THE EIGHTIES: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF REAGAN 114
(2005).
77 In a prescient article, Professor Galbraith argued that the market’s speculative
fervor in 1987 appeared reminiscent of that seen just before the crash of 1929. John
Kenneth Galbraith, The 1929 Parallel, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 62. Typifying
the public sentiment preceding the 1987 crash is the fact that The New York Times originally solicited Galbraith’s piece but ultimately rejected it as being “too alarming.” JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 9-10 (Whittle
Books in assoc. with Viking 1993).
78 For a comprehensive and entertaining look at the subject, see generally CHARLES
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (Harriman House 2003) (1841). In a well-timed episode for this author, as my 2008 Article
was in the editing process, the U.S. stock market once again demonstrated its volatility by
posting its largest one day decline since the 1987 crash, with the Dow Jones industrial
falling 778 points. Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, For Stocks, Worst Single-Day
Drop in Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A1.
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investing public’s tendency towards such “irrational exuberance,”79
many great investors have increased portfolio returns, and reduced portfolio risk, by eschewing popular investment trends and pursuing “contrarian” investment styles.80
The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule threatens to prohibit many contrarian investment directives, even those integral to a settlor’s purpose
in establishing a trust. An example will illustrate this phenomenon. Assume that it is early 2000. A sage investor has made a great fortune and
decides that she has accumulated sufficient assets to support herself and
several future generations of her family – enough wealth that all her
trustee needs to do is preserve her accumulated assets, not continue to
grow them. As such, this hypothetical settlor establishes a trust for her
children and directs that the trust be invested entirely in U.S. Treasury
Bills.81 She rationalizes this investment with the thought that even in
the event of a global economic meltdown, these short-term U.S. government obligations would retain their value. Her mandated investment
directive thus would insulate her children from the whims of the world’s
financial markets and ensure they would always have funds on which to
live. Through this strategy, the beneficiaries would never grow richer,
but they would never suffer a catastrophic loss.
This hypothetical settlor has a clear purpose for her trust: she wants
to preserve her beneficiaries’ wealth rather than enhance it. In pursuit
of this goal, she has imposed a precise investment restriction which directly furthers the purposes of the trust. Would a court applying the
emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule respect this settlor’s intent? The
likely answer is no. Since she deviates so widely from mainstream investment sentiment, it is easy to dismiss this settlor as a fear-monger and
marginalize her views as illogical and value-impairing.82 As a result, the
79

Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, coined the phrase
during a 1996 speech, musing: “[H]ow do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values . . . ?” See Richard W. Stevenson, A Buried Message Loudly
Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1996, at 35. The words have become the most famous uttered
during Greenspan’s long tenure, inspiring the title of a bestselling book and becoming a
catch phrase for the excessive stock market speculation of the late 1990s. ROBERT J.
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 1 (2d ed. 2005).
80 For an introduction to contrarian investing, see ANTHONY M. GALLEA & WILLIAM PATALON III, CONTRARIAN INVESTING ix (1998) (summarizing the fundamental
principle of this investment approach as “sell euphoria, buy panic”).
81 Because of their liquidity, short duration, and backing by the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government, treasury bills are considered the safest possible investment. See
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S FINANCE & INVESTMENT
HANDBOOK 226-27 (6th ed. 2003).
82 Such was the real world experience of Maureen Allyn, chief economist at the
global investment firm of Scudder, Stevens & Clark. When her firm was sold in 1998,
Allyn invested her proceeds in U.S. treasuries and municipal bonds. MAGGIE MAHAR,
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benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would provide a basis for ignoring these
restrictions.
This result is dictated by the simple fact that few investors in the
year 2000 shared our hypothetical settlor’s investment vision. While our
settlor wanted to keep her trust funds completely out of the stock market, the prevailing professional wisdom was that all long-term investors
simply had to include stocks in their portfolios. 83 While our settlor
feared a dark future for the investment markets, magazine and newspaper headlines boldly projected the Dow Jones Industrial Average84 to
grow from 11,497 on January 1, 200085 to 25,000 by 2010,86 and 3,000,000
by the end of the century.87 At a time when the nation was so enamored with the stock market that even professional reporters hinted that
they would not “dare suggest” the market might be overvalued,88 our
settlor wrongly deprived her beneficiaries of the ability to pursue these
further investment riches.
Given this public consensus, our settlor’s restrictions would have
been easy to classify as value-impairing ones.89 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would have freed this settlor’s trustees from these irrational
BULL!: A HISTORY OF THE BOOM, 1982-1999, 279-81, 287 (2003). Most of Allyn’s contemporaries on Wall Street considered her investment decision a completely irrational
one and responded “with that mixture of pity and annoyance reserved for those who fail
to appreciate a New Paradigm.” Id. at 287.
83 See Floyd Norris, Toward Dow 3,000,000 and Other Millennial Ruminations, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at C1 (reporting the prevailing market sentiment that “no long-term
investor should ever get out of stocks.”).
84 The Dow Jones Industrial Average, an unweighted average of thirty widely held
U.S. stocks, is the “oldest and most-quoted market indicator.” DOWNES & GOODMAN,
supra note 81, at 838. See also id. at 837-43 for an overview of a number of other market
indices.
85 Tom Petruno, 1999 Goes into the Record Book on Wall Street, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2000, at C1.
86 See Manuel Schiffres, Ladies and Gentlemen . . . Dow 25,000, KIPLINGER’S PERS.
FIN. MAG., Jan. 1, 2000, at 36. Far from attaining this lofty goal, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average actually declined in value over the ensuing decade and opened for trading ten
years later at a level of 10,428. Javier C. Hernandez, A Late Slide For the Year Of the
Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 1. 2010, at B1, B5.
87 Norris, supra note 83 at C1.
88 Joseph Nocera, Broken Records: A Fitting Farewell to the Nasdaq Decade, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 210 (“Once upon a time, we would have . . . [warned] of a speculative frenzy that couldn’t possibly last. Now we don’t dare suggest such a thing.”).
Further evidence of the prevailing investment climate of the time can be found in the fact
that of over 33,000 recommendations issued by Wall Street securities analysts in 1999 to
“buy,” “sell,” or “hold” specific stocks, only 125 were recommendations to “sell.” BENJAMIN MARK COLE, THE PIED PIPERS OF WALL STREET: HOW ANALYSTS SELL YOU
DOWN THE RIVER 97 (Bloomberg Press 2001).
89 A study of American financial history supports this conclusion that cautious and
prudent investment strategies are frequently branded as value-impairing. See GAL-
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investment shackles, enabling them to join the herd pursuing the everexpanding investment bubble of 2000.90 When that bubble burst, her
chosen beneficiaries would have shared the misery of countless others as
the stock market lost more than half its value in the ensuing three
years.91
The result of this hypothetical is problematic not simply because
history proved this trust settlor’s fears to be justified. Rather, the concern lies in the structural inability of any trust settlor to guard against an
economic or investment scenario which the mainstream of investors dismiss – a limitation that can frustrate a settlor’s most basic estate planning goals. As revealed by this example, a liberal reading of the benefitthe-beneficiaries rule would invite the investment community’s judgment to subsume that of the settlor, setting her trust fund on course
toward a highly unlikely, but theoretically possible,92 doomsday.93 The
BRAITH, supra note 75, at 6 (arguing that public sentiment typically marginalizes investors
who express doubts about lofty market valuations).
90 As Professor Cunningham succinctly warns: “Following the herd may seem rational and intelligent – until it stampedes straight off the cliff.” LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, HOW TO THINK LIKE BENJAMIN GRAHAM AND INVEST LIKE WARREN BUFFETT 5
(2001).
91 Floyd Norris, Stocks Surge, Ending Streak of Six Weeks with Losses, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2002, at C1. The devastation could have been far worse. For example, the U.S.
stock market lost 86.2% of its value during the Great Depression. Id. While the Depression is ancient history for many, significant stock market losses are not. On seventeen
separate occasions since 1963, one of the world’s financial markets has lost in excess of
50% of its value in a single year, including annual losses of 75% in Taiwan, 64% in Sweden, and 63% in the United Kingdom. SHILLER, supra note 79, at 134. Larger, longerterm declines have been equally prevalent in recent history. For example, Spain’s stock
market lost 86.6% of its value between December 1974 and December 1979, just one of
some twenty recent instances in which a nation’s stock market lost more than two-thirds
of its value within a five-year period. Id. at 136.
92 Even those professional investors who advocate contrarian investment strategies
and warn against the foolishness of following popular investment sentiments can miss the
point that an unprecedented market collapse remains possible, even if unlikely. As one
such author emphatically argued in 1998, “Treasury bills and government bonds, giltedged securities for centuries, are now surefire ways to destroy your nest egg. Conversely, investments always viewed as more speculative, such as common stocks, have
become outstanding vehicles to protect and enhance your capital. Yes, all the prudent
rules of savings we learned at our fathers’ knees are out the window.” DAVID DREMAN,
CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: THE NEXT GENERATION 28-29 (1998). Dreman
based his analysis on historical U.S. market data, concluding that since stocks historically
have outperformed government bonds, they always will. Id. at 305-10. Dreman’s error in
logic is so pervasive that the SEC requires all advertising for mutual funds to remind
investors that “past performance does not guarantee future results.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2009).
93 Given my argument that objective irrationality alone should be an insufficient
basis for voiding trust investment restrictions, I thus far have felt little need to defend the
merits of this hypothetical settlor’s decision to preserve her beneficiaries’ wealth rather
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prevailing wisdom of the stock market may force the trustee to do exactly what a settlor does not want him to do, undermining the fundamental purpose of a trust merely because it seems foolish to those that
history may prove to be the true fools.
Trust law should claim no victory in such a result. Far from the case
of the ill-advised settlor imposing a value-impairing investment restriction out of ignorance or a psychological need for control, this settlor is
doing so in order to provide her beneficiaries with the safest possible
source of funds. The prevailing wisdom of the market and mainstream
investment theory both argue that she is being far too conservative,
logic which she acknowledged but intentionally defied. Her fundamental purpose in establishing the trust thus is accorded no respect. Under
the guise of seeking to benefit the beneficiaries, the tyranny of the majority94 wrongly undermines the clear intent of this well-intentioned
settlor.
2. Repudiating Warren Buffett?
Unfortunately, the market-wary settlor discussed in the preceding
Section would not be the only type of investor potentially cast aside by
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. Rather, the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule would frustrate any settlors who rejected prevailing market wisdom
or who wished to mandate contrarian investment styles. This significant
flaw in the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is revealed by the fact that the
list of investors so impacted would include the person whose name has
become a synonym for investment success, Warren Buffett.
than enhance it. However, a recent exposition on the notion of risk suggests that the
settlor may be acting perfectly rationally. Given the client’s vast wealth, the marginal
utility of any potential investment gain is less than the disutility that would be caused by
an equivalent loss. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF RISK 112 (1996) (drawing upon the work of eighteenth-century Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli). As such, from a utility standpoint, the settlor is correct that
her beneficiaries have more to lose by investing in stocks than they have to gain.
94 The phrase is obviously borrowed from Alexis de Tocqueville, who warned that
once majority public opinion forms in America, “there are . . . no obstacles that can . . .
delay its advance, and allow it the time to hear the complaints of those it crushes as it
passes. . .” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 237 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000). Tocqueville saw lawyers as a partial antidote to this dangerous trend, concluding that “[w]hen the American people let
themselves be intoxicated by their passions or become so self-indulgent as to be carried
away by their ideas, the lawyers make themselves feel an almost invisible brake that
moderates and arrests them.” Id. at 256. An undeniably astute social commentator, Tocqueville also observed that America’s lawyers “form the superior political class and the
most intellectual portion of society.” Id.
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Warren Buffett has been one of the country’s most successful investors. Between the ages of twenty-six and thirty-nine, Buffett parlayed
$100 of personal funds into a $25 million investment portfolio,96 just one
step in a series of financial successes that would swell his net worth to
nearly $43 billion by 2004.97 He has justifiably become one of the most
influential figures in the investment world, with his unique investment
style both widely revered and frequently emulated. He is exactly the
type of thoughtful, successful investor that should be the standardbearer of modern trust investing.
Ironically, however, if a settlor tried to mandate Buffett’s investment style, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would provide a basis to
negate that provision. This perverse outcome results from the fact that
Buffett’s investment philosophy is the “polar opposite of modern portfolio theory,”98 and he rejects many investment principles incorporated
into the UPIA. For example, while the UPIA considers diversification a
fundamental principle of modern investing,99 Buffett generated much of
his fortune through highly-concentrated investments in approximately
ten companies’ stocks.100 He similarly thumbs his nose at the other
“main ingredients” of modern portfolio theory, disagreeing with the
prevailing view of risk, while rejecting the efficient market
hypothesis.101
95

95 A New York Times bestselling biography of Buffett would consider this characterization of Buffett an understatement. According to that source, Buffett is simply,
“The World’s Greatest Investor.” ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE WARREN BUFFETT WAY
1 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter HAGSTROM, BUFFETT WAY].
96 ROBERT P. MILES, WARREN BUFFETT WEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL
METHODS USED BY THE WORLD’S GREATEST INVESTOR 33-34 (2004). While an impressive feat for a man under forty, this was not Buffett’s first investment success. At age six,
he reportedly “purchased a six-pack of Coke bottles for 25 cents and sold them individually for a nickel each, setting a lifelong benchmark of a 20 percent investment return.”
Id. at 25. At age eleven he made his first successful equity investment, buying three
shares of City Service Preferred at $38 per share and selling them at $40. Id. at 26.
97 HAGSTROM, BUFFETT WAY, supra note 95, at 1.
98 ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE WARREN BUFFETT PORTFOLIO: MASTERING THE
POWER OF THE FOCUS INVESTMENT STRATEGY 31 (1999) [hereinafter HAGSTROM, BUFFETT PORTFOLIO].
99 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
100 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 90, at 13. An example of Buffett’s willingness to take
concentrated risks on particular stocks can be found in the fact that between 1991 and
1997, Coca-Cola Co. stock represented between 34% and 43% of his entire investment
portfolio. HAGSTROM, BUFFETT PORTFOLIO, supra note 98, at 61.
101 HAGSTROM, BUFFETT PORTFOLIO, supra note 98, at 29-35. Buffett’s business
partner, Charlie Munger, evidenced similar disdain for the principles of modern portfolio
theory, calling them “a type of dementia I can’t even classify.” JANET LOWE, WARREN
BUFFETT SPEAKS: WIT AND WISDOM FROM THE WORLD’S GREATEST INVESTOR 94
(1997).
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Since the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule defines benefit by reference
to the prevailing standards of the time, Buffett’s rejection of widespread
investor sentiment places him in direct conflict with this rule.102 As
such, a trust provision mandating Buffett’s investment approach would
be per se imprudent under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule.
This result speaks for itself. Something is clearly wrong when an
emerging rule of trust investment law repudiates “the world’s greatest
investor.”103
E. Ignores Key Goals of Estate Planning
A fifth undesirable consequence of the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule results from the fact that it narrowly defines “benefit” to mean
wealth maximization. This approach fails to reflect the reality that many
settlors engage in estate planning and establish trusts in order to benefit
their chosen beneficiaries in a variety of ways – not only financially, but
also personally and perhaps even spiritually.104 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule threatens a settlor’s ability to pursue these other worthwhile
types of benefits.
1.

Personal Benefit

Some settlors utilize trusts to achieve personal benefits for their
chosen beneficiaries. For example, assume a settlor wishes to fund a
trust with a valuable vacation home in order to preserve the home for
the use of her two children. Such a trust of necessity requires a stringent
investment restriction mandating that the residence be retained for the
beneficiaries’ use rather than sold.
Both traditional principles of trust law and the emerging rule would
respect such an investment restriction. Traditional law would achieve
this result because the restriction at issue, retention of a personal resi102

As Buffett told investors in the 1994 Annual Meeting of Berkshire Hathaway:
“You can’t get rich with a weather vane.” LOWE, supra note 101, at 96.
103 See supra note 95.
104 Shelly Steiner, Note, Incentive Conditions: The Validity of Innovative Financial
Parenting by Passing Along Wealth and Values, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 897, 897 (2006) (contending that many settlors use trusts not only to transfer wealth to future generations, but
also to “pass down their work ethic, religion, educational goals, and philanthropic values”); see also JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH – KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY
209 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004) (observing “that a family’s wealth consists of three forms
of capital – human, intellectual, and financial – and that the management of the first two
is the most critical to the successful preservation of a family’s wealth”); John J. Scroggin,
Restraining an Inheritance Can Accomplish a Client’s Objectives, 30 EST. PLAN. 124, 124
(2003) (observing that for many clients, “[t]he pivotal goal of estate planning is to protect
and preserve the family, not to protect and preserve the assets”).
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dence, is not even remotely illegal or immoral.105 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule reaches the same result through a different analysis. Per
Professor Langbein, the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule respects
this settlor’s wishes because the asset at issue – the personal residence –
simply is not held for investment.106
While this exception to the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule initially
seems to enable the type of personal planning integral to modern estate
planning, it actually does not. Exempting assets “not held for investment” from analysis under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule requires
trustees to classify trust holdings into one of two categories, separating
assets held for investment from those held for the beneficiaries’ personal use. Yet this dichotomy is artificial. Returning to a prior example,107 what of a settlor’s directive to retain a family business? Does the
settlor intend that the asset be held for investment, and thus subject it to
the restrictions imposed by the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule? Or is this
asset to be held for personal use, perhaps as a source of education, prestige, or employment for younger family members? While the typical
settlor probably views retaining the family business as serving both investment and personal goals, the emerging regime does not adequately
envision such a middle ground.
Professor Langbein seems to suggest that a middle ground does exist, arguing that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule might exempt assets
that “are not being held for investment (or not wholly for investment).”108 The rule he applies, however, is very different from the one
he states. For example, in considering a directive to retain a family business as a source of prestige and influence for the beneficiaries, Langbein
concludes that the directive will be honored where the benefits “outweigh the superior expected investment returns of a diversified portfolio.”109 Accordingly, this provision is enforceable not because the
settlor intended the asset to be held “not wholly for investment,” but
rather because the trustee objectively determined that any non-investment benefits outweigh their attendant economic costs.
This approach is inconsistent with the typical goals of trust settlors
and is detached from the realities of modern estate planning. Some
trusts are established for a variety of purposes, and a settlor may knowingly wish to impair the trust’s economic performance to pursue other
105

See supra note 29.
Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1114-15 (characterizing retention of
a residence solely for the beneficiaries’ personal use as “another circumstance in which
an undiversified portfolio may be quite justified”).
107 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
108 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1114 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 1116.
106
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ends. The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would seemingly honor the settlor’s choices only when pursuit of the settlor’s non-financial goals objectively appear to be worth the economic cost. This approach simply
fails to meet settlors’ needs, offering them insufficient security that trust
law will honor and effectuate their estate planning goals.
2. Spiritual Benefit
The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule similarly undermines a settlor’s
ability to safeguard her beneficiaries’ spiritual health through restraints
on trust investments. Many trust settlors are concerned not only with
beneficiaries’ economic wealth, but also with their personal and moral
development.110 Some settlors may turn to investment restrictions to
help reinforce desired moral values. The arrangement would effectuate
an unspoken quid pro quo – future generations are welcome to live off
the continuing fruits of the settlor’s past investments, but must do so
while embracing the values which guided and constrained the settlor’s
accumulation of wealth.
A settlor seeking to impart such values might impose a negative
restriction on the selection of trust investments – directing her fiduciaries to avoid certain companies or certain industries. Perhaps, for example, the settlor finds cigarette manufacturers to be morally repugnant
and wishes to ensure that her trust beneficiaries are never tainted by an
investment in such a firm. Is such a socially responsible111 investment
directive enforceable?112 Under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, the
110

See generally Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445 (2006) (describing settlors’ use of
“incentive trusts” to encourage and reward desirable behavior). See also sources cited
supra note 104.
111 The term “socially responsible investing” (“SRI”) refers to the process of selecting companies in which to invest based not only on business and economic factors but
also after considering the social, environmental, and political impact of those companies
and the products they make. Pursuing an SRI strategy typically requires an investor to
avoid certain companies and industries, such as those that pollute the environment, employ questionable labor practices, or produce morally-questionable products such as alcohol and tobacco. For an overview of SRI and a brief history of its origins, see JOHN C.
HARRINGTON, INVESTING WITH YOUR CONSCIENCE: HOW TO ACHIEVE HIGH RETURNS
USING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 3-42 (1992) (tracing the SRI movement from
the 1800s to the modern day). For a comprehensive modern look at SRI, including a
detailed discussion of the question of the interplay between SRI and fiduciary duties, see
generally Joel C. Dobris, SRI – Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing,
That Is), 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755 (2008).
112 For a consideration of the reverse question of whether a trustee may engage in
socially responsible investing absent the settlor’s directive to do so, see Charles E.
Rounds, Jr., Social Investing, IOLTA and the Law of Trusts: The Settlor’s Case Against
the Political Use of Charitable and Client Funds, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 163, 192 (1990)
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answer seems to be that it is not.113 From the standpoint of wealth accumulation, categorically abrogating one potential type of investment
simply cannot financially benefit the beneficiaries.114
Thus, despite her personal wishes, a trust settlor must empower her
trustees to profit from enterprises that foster lung cancer, water pollution, and social injustice, because that is the way to maximize the financial interests of the trust beneficiaries.115 The result deviates from the
wishes of increasing numbers of American investors,116 while contradicting a clear international trend favoring investment in more socially
responsible companies.117
The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule could undermine a settlor’s social
and political values. It also may violate her fundamental religious beliefs. For example, Islamic law (or “Shari’ah”) takes traditional concepts of social investing one step further, not only prohibiting
investment in traditional “sin stocks” of companies selling alcohol, tobacco, and weaponry, but also those selling pork products, financial services and entertainment, and those incurring high levels of debt.118 An
(concluding that unauthorized socially responsible investing violates the trustee’s fiduciary duties).
113 Professor Langbein has long advocated this result. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 85-92 (1980)
(arguing that socially responsible investing reduces diversification and increases portfolio
risk).
114 Efforts to quantify the financial impact of SRI restrictions yield conflicting results. See RUSSELL SPARKES, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: A GLOBAL REVOLUTION 243-54 (2002) (demonstrating the difficulties in analyzing SRI by discussing various
studies yielding divergent results). Nevertheless, it seems intuitive that an investment
restriction that requires categorical avoidance of certain types of investments cannot
serve to enhance returns. Proponents of SRI regularly concede this point. See, e.g., HARRINGTON, supra note 111, at 55 (quoting a representative of the U.S. Trust Company who
concluded that “[s]ome social criteria will have an impact on performance”); ELIZABETH
JUDD, INVESTING WITH A SOCIAL CONSCIENCE 12 (1990) (“Everyone agrees that restricting investments to those that jibe with an investor’s conscience means passing up some
stellar financial opportunities . . . .”).
115 For the argument that individuals seeking to maximize their investment returns
actually should seek out the very stocks that SRI eschews, see, e.g., DAN AHRENS, INVESTING IN VICE: THE RECESSION-PROOF PORTFOLIO OF BOOZE, BETS, BOMBS, AND
BUTTS (2004) (advocating investments in the alcohol, gambling, defense, tobacco, and
adult entertainment industries).
116 See SPARKES, supra note 114, at 354-59 (detailing the significant growth in socially
responsible investing in the U.S.).
117 See id. at 367-90 (chronicling the growth of socially responsible investing in Europe and Asia).
118 Christopher F. Richardson, Islamic Finance Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector: An Introduction to an Emerging Field, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 119, 125-28 (2006).
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Islamic investor may wish to invest solely in “Shari’ah-compliant” companies that meet these requirements.119
Shari’ah-compliant restrictions often run directly counter to traditional notions of prudent trust investing. Specifically, achieving adequate diversification, a fundamental precept of prudent investing,120
becomes a significant issue for a Shari’ah-compliant investment portfolio.121 For example, a recent analysis found that five of the ten largest
holdings in the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, a prototypical
Shari’ah-compliant portfolio, are oil companies. 122 Conversely, financial firms were almost completely excluded from this model portfolio.123
As is the case with socially responsible investing, little data is available to compare the performance of Shari’ah-compliant portfolios with
non-compliant ones.124 Nevertheless, to the extent these religious principles serve to restrict the available pool of potential investments, that
action is likely to impede a trust’s investment prospects, a notion freely

119 See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic
Law and Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 108, 133 (2003).
120 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
121 Rushdi Siddiqui, Shari’ah Compliance, Performance, and Conversion: The Case of
the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 501 (2007). “[N]ot enough
pure Shari’ah-compliant companies exist for a diversified portfolio.” Id. As a result,
many Islamic portfolios of necessity include a number of investments which technically
violate the principles of Islamic investing. Indeed, “a little impermissibility, as interpreted by the Shari’ah scholars, is accepted . . . .” Id.
122 Id. at 512 (including Exxon Mobil Corp., BP PLC, Total S.A., Chevron Corp., and
Royal Dutch Shell PLC among the “top ten” holdings of the Dow Jones Islamic Market
Index). Of the 282 oil and gas companies that are part of the Dow Jones World Index,
192 meet the criteria for inclusion in the Islamic Market Index. Id. at 508, 511.
123 Only 28 of the 1214 financial firms in the Dow Jones World Index qualify as
acceptable Islamic investments. An investor bound by Islamic principles is thus precluded from investing in approximately 98% of the world’s financial services firms. Siddiqui, supra note 121, at 508, 511.
124 Mr. Siddiqui contends that Shari’ah-compliant portfolios perform as well as their
conventional brethren. See id. at 512. Data provided by Dow Jones does not support this
contention. The Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index generated a 4.59% annualized
return for the ten-year period ending April 30, 2012. DOW JONES ISLAMIC MARKET
WORLD INDEX, FACT SHEET (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/fact_info/Dow_Jones_Islamic_Market_World_Index_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
The unrestricted Global Total Stock Market Index generated a 6.63% annualized return
for the same period. DOW JONES GLOBAL TOTAL STOCK MARKET INDEXES, FACT SHEET
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/fact_info/Dow_
Jones_Global_Total_Stock_Market_Indexes_Fact_Sheet.pdf. For the 10-year period ending September 30, 2008, the unrestricted index similarly outperformed the Shari’ah-compliant one. See Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at 1195 n.140 (summarizing
data).
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acknowledged among Islamic investors.125 A clause mandating Shari’ah
compliance therefore could be set aside under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, enabling the Islamic settlor’s trust funds to be invested in a
manner which fundamentally violates her core religious beliefs.126
F. Defeats Estate Tax Planning
A final undesirable consequence of the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is that it would undermine some of the most sophisticated
forms of estate tax planning. In particular, two common estate planning
techniques, the Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (“ILIT”) and the Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (“GRAT”), could become largely unworkable under the emerging regime.
1. The ILIT
For many individuals, prudent estate planning involves making inter vivos gifts to family members in order to reduce the imposition of
estate and gift taxes.127 One asset that many individuals will give away
most freely is their life insurance, particularly any term life insurance.128
After all, life insurance proceeds are paid only after the insured’s death,
125 See Kathleen Pender, Faith-Based Funds a Growing Subset of Socially Responsible Investing, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2006, at J1 (“In the Islamic [investing] community
there’s a term, ‘COBM,’ or the cost of being Muslim.”).
126 Although this is well beyond the scope of this Article, a conflict between the
UTC’s mandatory rule and principles of Shari’ah-compliant investing might implicate
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.
127 Inter vivos gifting is a tax-efficient form of wealth transfer for three major reasons. First, any appreciation or income generated by a gifted asset after the time of the
gift inures to the donee without imposition of additional estate or gift taxation. Second,
certain exemptions from the estate and gift tax apply only to lifetime gifts. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (establishing a tax-free “annual exclusion” currently equal to $13,000
per donee). Third, the gift tax is computed on a tax-exclusive basis (i.e., the donor’s
funds used to pay the gift tax are not themselves subject to gift taxation), whereas the
estate tax is computed on a tax-inclusive basis (i.e., the estate tax is computed on the
decedent’s entire estate, including the portion of the estate that will be used to pay such
taxes). For an overview of these and other considerations, see RAY D. MADOFF, CORNELIA R. TENNEY, MARTIN A. HALL & LISA N. MINGOLLA, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE
PLANNING § 8.03 (2011 ed.).
128 There are two major forms of life insurance: “term” insurance and “permanent”
(or “cash value”) insurance. Term insurance is akin to automobile or homeowner’s insurance insofar as the insured pays an annual premium each year for one year of coverage.
Permanent insurance differs in that the policy actually grows in value each year. The
owner of a permanent policy thus may be able to cash in that policy or borrow against its
cash value in a future year. Since the donor who gives away such a policy loses access to
this cash value, the decision to give away permanent insurance involves more complex
planning considerations than are implicated with a gift of pure term insurance. For a
brief summary of various insurance products, see LOUIS A. MEZZULLO, AN ESTATE
PLANNER’S GUIDE TO LIFE INSURANCE 7-10 (2000). For a more detailed analysis of these
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a time at which the insured is rather unlikely to generate any personal
enjoyment from the use of the proceeds.129 Accordingly, while most
settlors initially balk at the thought of parting with control of incomeproducing or business assets, life insurance gifts involve a “relative lack
of pain.”130
When transferring their life insurance, many well-advised settlors
establish a trust for family members rather than making an outright
gift.131 This structure can avoid many of the administrative difficulties
that arise from having insurance owned by multiple family members,132
as well as maximize gift tax planning opportunities.133 The specialized
trust utilized to hold life insurance is known as an Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust.134 A properly structured ILIT will enable the settlor to
give away her life insurance without the imposition of any estate or gift
taxation.135
Inherent in the decision to implement an ILIT, and reflected in the
trust’s name, is the settlor’s expectation that the trust will own solely life
insurance. However, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule could subvert
this expectation and undermine this common technique. Viewed
through the narrow lens of modern portfolio theory, the investment of
an entire trust portfolio in life insurance policies is no more prudent
than a decision to retain an undiversified stock portfolio. As a result,
even if holding a specific life insurance policy would further the settlor’s
products, see RICHARD A. SCHWARTZ & CATHERINE R. TURNER, LIFE INSURANCE DUE
CARE: CARRIERS, PRODUCTS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS 165-286 (2d ed. 1994).
129 In this way, life insurance materially differs from other assets which may generate
income during the settlor’s life and thus would be more difficult (both economically and
psychologically) for a living settlor to give away. See HUGHES, JR., supra note 104, at 97
(“In the thirty-five years I have practiced law, giving up ownership of anything is the
most difficult issue my clients have faced . . . .”).
130 Stephan R. Leimberg et al., THE NEW NEW BOOK OF TRUSTS 217 (3d ed. 2002).
131 See Robert A. Goldman, Why Life Insurance Should Be Estate Tax Exempt, 9
PROB. & PROP, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 30 (detailing five reasons why a gift of life insurance in
trust is preferable to an outright gift).
132 See MEZZULLO, supra note 128, at 37 (characterizing an ILIT as “the only way”
to give life insurance efficiently to multiple beneficiaries).
133 An ILIT can be structured as a “Crummey trust,” gifts to which can qualify for
the $13,000 per donee annual exclusion from federal gift tax under I.R.C. § 2503(b). See
Crummey v. Comm’r., 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968) (authorizing the technique); Estate
of Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74, 83-84 (1991) (reaffirming Crummey and expanding
its scope).
134 See generally LAWRENCE BRODY & DONALD O. JANSEN, THE IRREVOCABLE
LIFE INSURANCE TRUST: FORMS WITH DRAFTING NOTES (2d ed. 1999) for a detailed
introduction to ILITs, including sample forms and analysis of tax consequences. See also
Richard C. Baier, Drafting Flexibility into an Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 19 PROB.
& PROP., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 62-65 (offering ILIT drafting suggestions).
135 Baier, supra note 134, at 65.
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sole purpose in establishing the trust, a trustee seeking to comply with
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule might well feel compelled to diversify
into other investments.136
In his 2010 essay, Professor Langbein contended that my worries
about the continued viability of this estate planning technique are unfounded, but added a telling caveat by indicating that the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule would allow ILITs “when . . . deployed as part of a
suitably diversified, multi-asset estate plan.”137 That additional restriction is a troubling one. In practice, many settlors implement an ILIT as
their first, and often sole, inter vivos trust. These trusts arguably would
not be “part of a suitably diversified, multi-asset estate plan” and thus
would not meet Professor Langbein’s proffered test.138
Under this emerging regime, a settlor would be left with two
choices: keep her life insurance and expose the proceeds to transfer taxation, or gift those policies away to a trustee who might liquidate them
in full or in part. Since the settlor cannot achieve what she wants – to
merely re-title her life insurance policies into an ILIT – she might simply decide not to implement the ILIT at all. To the extent the settlor
makes this choice, the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would
have served only to expose the beneficiaries’ future insurance proceeds
to previously avoidable estate taxation – a bizarre “benefit” indeed.
2.

The GRAT

The Grantor Retained Annuity Trust is one of the most attractive
estate planning tools available to a wealthy settlor.139 In this arrangement, the settlor establishes a trust for a set period of years, during
which time she will receive a fixed annual annuity payment from the
trust.140 At the conclusion of the chosen term, any remaining trust assets pass to the settlor’s designated beneficiaries, typically her children
136 At least one state legislature has addressed this concern by exempting most trustowned life insurance policies from the UPIA’s default duty to diversify. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1)(B) (2012).
137 Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 14, at 393. Professor Langbein also
suggests that an ILIT could be justified based on its programmatic goals, “such as providing liquidity for survivors during estate administration and funding estate taxes.” Id.
138 Practicing lawyers consider this possibility a very real fear. For example, the
Ohio Bar Association recently proposed a modification to Ohio law specifically to exempt ILITs from the duty to diversify. See James Spallino, Jr., Drafting and Administering Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts: The Basics and Beyond, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 91, 9798 (2009) (discussing the proposed legislation).
139 Unlike many other sophisticated estate planning techniques, the GRAT is sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 2702; 26 C.F.R. § 25.2702-0 to -3
(2009).
140 See Steve R. Akers, Going the Extra Mile with GRATs – Reflections on Optimal
Planning Strategies, 18 PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 24.
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or a trust for their benefit.141 The great allure of the technique is that
the settlor’s taxable gift to the beneficiaries is calculated based on extremely favorable valuation tables rather than on the actual performance of the trust.142 The gift computed under these tables may be little
or nothing, even though the GRAT beneficiaries ultimately may receive
substantial wealth.
The following example will help illustrate the typical structure and
potential tax benefits of a GRAT. Assume a settlor establishes a twoyear GRAT and funds it with $1,000,000 of IBM stock. Depending on
IRS interest rates in effect at the time,143 the grantor is entitled to two
annuity payments of approximately $515,000 each.144 Since the value of
the grantor’s retained annuity is equal to the full amount contributed to
the GRAT, there is no gift tax assessed upon the settlor,145 and no income, gift, or estate tax imposed on any assets which may ultimately
pass to the beneficiaries at the end of the term.146
Despite that enticing upside, there are no offsetting negative tax
consequences if a GRAT suffers poor investment performance and is
unable to fully satisfy the settlor’s reserved annuity payments. In that
case, the settlor simply takes back all the available GRAT assets and the
arrangement terminates.147 Since there is no limit to the number of
GRATs a settlor may establish, the settlor would be free to simply gift
the same assets to another GRAT and try again.
141

Id. at 24-25.
See Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Running the Numbers: An Economic Analysis of
GRATs and QPRTs, SM007 ALI-ABA 467 (2007) (explaining in detail the required
computations).
143 The grantor’s actuarial interest in a GRAT is computed based upon prevailing
interest rates as reported monthly by the IRS. I.R.C. § 7520. For example, for transfers
in the month of September 2011, the applicable rate was 2.0%. Rev. Proc. 2011-20, 201136 I.R.B. 202.
144 Utilizing the 2.0% applicable interest rate for September 2011, Rev. Proc. 201120, 2011-36 I.R.B. 202, a settlor seeking to minimize the gift tax consequences of a GRAT
would retain an annual annuity of $515,039.10. These figures were calculated using estate
planning software. Brentmark Software, Inc., Estate Planning Tools, (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.brentmark.com/estateplanning.htm (results on file with author).
145 If the settlor retains an annuity equal in value to the initial GRAT corpus, the gift
tax value of the remainder interest is zero. As a result, the settlor owes no gift tax upon
creating and funding such a “zeroed-out” GRAT. This approach has been validated by
the Tax Court. See Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589, 602 (2000), acq. I.R.S. Notice 200372, 2003-44 I.R.B. 964.
146 Akers, supra note 140, at 25.
147 David J. Wilfert & Martha J. Leighton, Matching the Estate Planning Tool to the
Investment Plan, in ESTATE PLANNING & ADMINISTRATION 529, 567 (PLI Tax Law & Est.
Plan., Course Handbook Series No. D0-0096, 2002) (“The worst that can happen with a
GRAT . . . is that it does not ‘work,’ in which case the beneficiaries get nothing and the
grantor is left with approximately what he would have had if he had done nothing.”).
142
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The settlor who decides to implement a GRAT does so in lieu of
two far simpler alternatives. First, the settlor could simply retain the
underlying property and dispose of it at death. Second, she could give
the underlying assets directly to her chosen beneficiaries, or to trusts for
their benefit, without retaining any annuity payments. The settlor who
chooses a GRAT over these other alternatives does so because she
wishes to achieve the best of both approaches – retaining an annuity
stream from the gifted property while giving any significant appreciation
thereof to her chosen beneficiaries.
Given both the grantor’s estate planning goal of passing future appreciation to her chosen beneficiaries and the one-sided gift tax consequences of a GRAT, the typical logic behind GRAT investing differs
significantly from that of other forms of trusts.148 Most notably, investment volatility generally enhances the potential estate planning benefits
of the technique. 149 To maximize this volatility, a GRAT portfolio typically is not diversified.150
Unfortunately, as logical as it may be from an estate planning and
transfer tax perspective, this standard approach to GRAT investing defies modern portfolio theory and thus seemingly defies the emerging
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. As a result, the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule could effectively destroy GRATs as estate planning devices.
To see how this would happen, consider the trustee’s approach to
investment of the hypothetical GRAT outlined above. Typically, the
trustee would retain the IBM stock gifted to the GRAT and seek to
capitalize on the volatility of the undiversified portfolio.151 Such an approach, however, is hard to defend as one that will benefit the trust beneficiaries. Specifically, the trustee must take extremely little investment
risk in order to provide the settlor with her full annuity payments from
the GRAT.152 Thus, retaining the IBM stock does nothing to assist this
148 See Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Next Bout: Drafting and Administration to
Maximize GRAT Performance, 20 PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 20 (arguing that
modern portfolio theory “does not necessarily apply . . . in the context of a GRAT”).
149 See A. Silvana Giner, GRITs, GRATs and GRUTs, in DRAFTING IRREVOCABLE
TRUSTS IN MASSACHUSETTS § 9.2h.1(b) (2005) (“[T]he GRAT strategy is most useful
where assets have significant volatility . . . .”); Wilfert & Leighton, supra note 147, at 575
(calling volatility a “positive force” in the context of a GRAT).
150 See Stephen F. Lappert, IRC Sec. 2702 – GRITs (Including Personal Residence
Trusts and QPRTs), GRATs and GRUTs, in 29TH ANNUAL ESTATE PLANNING UPDATE
773, 838 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan., Course Handbook Series No. D0-001N, 1998) (“[I]t
is recommended that GRATs be asset-specific so that the gains from one investment will
not be eroded by the losses from another.”).
151 See supra notes 1499-150 and accompanying text.
152 In order to fully satisfy the settlor’s retained annuity payments, the GRAT must
generate an investment return that meets or exceeds the applicable Treasury interest rate.
See supra note 143. Accordingly, the settlor will receive maximum benefit from a GRAT
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trust beneficiary.153 From the standpoint of the future remaindermen,
the trustee’s approach is equally indefensible – a textbook example of
investment speculation which offers the potential for a huge windfall,
but increases the likelihood that these beneficiaries will receive nothing
at all.154
Taking into account the settlor’s estate tax planning goals, her opportunity to create multiple GRATs, and the favorable gift tax consequences of those GRATs, it may be perfectly logical for the trustee to
retain an undiversified portfolio. Yet, a court applying the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule likely would not operate from that perspective.
Rather, when the trustee must defend against a future claim brought by
the remaindermen of a single unsuccessful GRAT, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule will prompt a single question: how was retaining all that
IBM stock calculated to benefit the beneficiaries of this particular trust?
The trustee may well have no response.155
The emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, therefore, requires the
trustee to do something the settlor and her estate planner might well
consider unthinkable: immediately sell the stock contributed to a GRAT
and invest the proceeds in a diversified portfolio. While such an approach seemingly meets the dictates of the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule, it fundamentally undermines the potential effectiveness of the
established in September 2011 as long as the GRAT portfolio earns a meager 2.0% investment return. See supra note 143.
153 One possible exception is that the settlor would be personally liable for any capital gains tax triggered upon the sale of the GRAT asset. This could be a material consideration in some circumstances. Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax Planning
Method Patents Meet Tax Practice, Making Attorneys the Latest Patent Infringers, 8 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 33, 79 (2008).
154 An illustration will help prove the point. Assuming the hypothetical GRAT discussed in this Section averages a 5% investment return over the two-year term, the remaindermen will receive a distribution of $46,670 at the end of the term. If the GRAT
investment return increases to 7%, the remaindermen will receive $78,769, an increase of
69%. Conversely, an investment return of 3% will leave the remaindermen with $15,371,
a decrease of 67%. A return of 2% will leave them with nothing at all. Minor changes in
investment return thus have an extremely dramatic impact on the remaindermen of a
GRAT, making their trust interest uniquely sensitive to the volatility of an undiversified
portfolio. There figures were calculated using estate planning software. Brentmark
Software, Inc., Estate Planning Tools, (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.brentmark.com/estateplanning.htm (results on file with author).
155 In his 2010 essay, Professor Langbein seemingly agreed that the Trustee’s failure
to diversify a GRAT should be justifiable since “there is a world of difference between
the uncompensated risk resulting from the underdiversification in the IBM case, and the
compensated risk found in the GRAT.” Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 14,
at 393 n.134. Professor Langbein did not, however, adequately address the question of
how the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would operate to reflect this significant
difference.

396

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:365

GRAT as a tool for minimizing estate and gift taxation. Thus, just as it
did with the ILIT, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule seriously threatens
this established estate planning technique.
III. THE SETTLORS RESPOND
As illustrated above, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule’s assault on
dead-hand control would topple key principles of trust law and undermine the estate planning efforts of many trust settlors. However, those
settlors and their estate planners have living hands, not dead ones. As a
result, they can, and predictably will, respond to these undesirable
changes in trust law and seek to minimize their impact. Put simply, if
trust law seems calculated to reject settlors’ clear wishes, then settlors
will reject trust law.
In this Part, I consider a number of techniques that creative settlors
and skilled estate planners will likely deploy to negate the effect of the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. As can be said of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule itself, these countermeasures are problematic by virtue of
their imprecision, depriving settlors and beneficiaries of desirable elements of trust law in a quest to avoid the undesirable. Nevertheless,
attorneys active in the field of estate planning may have little choice but
to consider availing their clients of these means of negating the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. Through this two step process – emergence of a rule that fails to serve the needs of trust settlors followed by
settlors predictably reacting to that rule – trust law ends up being less
useful, and ultimately less relevant, than before. Unfortunately, this
could be the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule’s ultimate legacy.
A. The Ignorant Trustee
As discussed above, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule could fundamentally alter the trustee’s traditional role.156 Rather than loyally following the settlor’s directives, a trustee frequently would be obligated to
challenge those directives and undermine the settlor’s intent.
The settlor, however, is the one who chooses the trustee. This creates a problematic dynamic. A settlor concerned about the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule undermining her estate plan would have a clear incentive to select a trustee who is either too ignorant to know of the benefitthe-beneficiaries rule or too deferential to follow its dictates. The more
professional the trustee and the more he understands and adheres to the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, the less likely a future trust settlor would
be to select such a trustee.
156

See supra Part II.B.
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The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule thus creates exactly the wrong incentives with respect to the selection of trustees. Modern scholars have
rightly expressed great concern with the inefficiencies and agency costs
that result from the settlor selecting a trustee to administer the beneficiaries’ funds.157 The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule exacerbates this
problem by encouraging settlors to saddle trust beneficiaries with trustees chosen not for their wisdom, but rather for their ignorance.
A settlor seeking to find such an ignorant trustee would have many
options. Settlors may increasingly turn to friends or relatives to act as
fiduciaries, attracted to those individuals because of their lack of professional training and limited understanding of the emerging obligations of
a trustee.158 This would put increasing amounts of trust dollars in decreasingly qualified hands, reversing the current trend toward the use of
professional fiduciaries.159 Even worse, the resulting competitive pressures may well encourage otherwise competent trustees to turn a blind
eye to their emerging fiduciary duties when doing so will help appease
trust settlors and secure trust business.160
Step one for the settlor seeking to avoid the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule thus may be to find a trustee who is too ignorant to understand it.
B. The Convenient Beneficiaries
The determination of whether an investment directive will benefit
the beneficiaries necessarily depends on the identity of those beneficiaries. Accordingly, a second predictable response to the benefit-the157

See Sitkoff, supra note 56, at 663 (discussing the tensions created by the fact that
the settlor chooses a trustee while the beneficiaries bear the burdens of that selection).
158 See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and
Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2719 (2006) (“[Settlors] may not expect nonprofessional trustees to possess . . . an expert’s knowledge of the law.”); Timothy P.
O’Sullivan, Family Harmony: An All Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 253, 263 (2007) (“Family fiduciaries generally are much
less informed and less diligent than experienced, competent third parties . . . .”). Trust
law reinforces this trend by holding nonprofessional trustees to a lower standard of conduct than their professional counterparts. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt.
(1994) (“[T]he standard for professional trustees is the standard of prudent professionals;
for amateurs, it is the standard of prudent amateurs.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 77(3) (2003) (“If the trustee possesses, or procured appointment by purporting
to possess, special facilities or greater skill than that of a person of ordinary prudence, the
trustee has a duty to use such facilities or skill.”).
159 See Sitkoff, supra note 56, at 633.
160 See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 559
n.68 (1998) (noting a rumor that one new trust bank “will not hire any lawyers with prior
trust experience because those lawyers are too ‘fussy.’”).
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beneficiaries rule would be for settlors to manipulate beneficial interests
in trusts, favoring beneficiaries whose interests arguably would be
served by pursuing the settlor’s desired investment restrictions.
This suggestion is not as extreme as it may at first appear. In many
cases, a minor change in the structure of a trust will alter the impact of
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. For example, consider a hypothetical
family business which employs the settlor’s three daughters, but not his
son. If the settlor places company stock in separate trusts for each child,
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule militates in favor of diversifying the
stock held in the son’s trust. After all, the son is not involved in the
business, and thus the stock owned by his trust is a mere portfolio investment. A clause directing retention of the stock in such a trust could
be assailed as simply benefiting the beneficiary’s sisters to the detriment
of the beneficiary himself, and thus could be void under the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule.
In contrast, if the settlor establishes a single trust for all four children, three of whom are active in the business, a clause directing retention of the business appears quite different in this new context.
Certainly, the duties of loyalty161 and impartiality162 will still require the
trustee to consider the interests of the son when implementing the
trust’s investment policy. Yet, as long as the son’s stock is commingled
with his sisters’, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is marginalized as a
potential basis for selling a family business which employs three of the
four trust beneficiaries. The settlor thus has an easy way around the
emerging doctrine by combining these multiple trusts into one.163
Even where such a modest change of structure will not insulate the
settlor from the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, it may be possible to simply add additional beneficiaries to stack the deck in favor of the settlor’s
investment directives. For example, reconsider the example of the settlor who directs her trustees to exclude cigarette companies from the
161 Judge Cardozo penned the classic description of a trustee’s duty of loyalty: “Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928). For a more modern discussion of the duty of loyalty, see In re Estate of
Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 932-52, 965-78 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (removing and surcharging fiduciaries for self-interested transactions involving the estate of the famous painter, Mark
Rothko), modified, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1st Dep’t 1977), aff’d, 372 N.E.2d 291 (1977).
162 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2003) (“A trustee has a duty to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries of
the trust. . . .”).
163 The son/beneficiary is arguably worse off than he was before the change. Since
there is now one trust for all four children, it has become structurally impossible to sell
“his” stock without also selling his sisters’ shares.
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trust portfolio as part of a “socially conscious” trust investment strategy.164 If this settlor wants to increase the likelihood that her anti-tobacco investment restriction will survive a challenge under the benefitthe-beneficiaries rule, perhaps she should simply add the American
Lung Association as a potential trust beneficiary.165 Once the trust beneficiaries include an organization committed to the eradication of lung
cancer, the settlor’s bar on investment in cigarette companies becomes a
provision which serves the present interests of the trust beneficiaries
rather than a profit-draining relic of the settlor’s dead hand.166
Manipulating the number and nature of trust beneficiaries, even in
nominal ways, is thus a second means by which trust settlors can negate
the impact of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. This response produces
another bizarre consequence: instead of aiding trust beneficiaries, the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule would lead settlors to disenfranchise those
beneficiaries by combining trusts or by adding additional beneficiaries.
C. The Desirable Jurisdiction
The UTC is intended to promote uniformity of trust law among the
fifty states.167 There are two key limits to this effort. First, state legislatures remain free to customize the Code as they see fit.168 Second, a
trust settlor, regardless of her state of domicile, has considerable ability
to select which state’s law will govern a specific trust.169 Settlors thus
164

See supra Part II.E.2.
This suggestion is not as extreme as it might seem to be. The UTC defines “beneficiary” expansively as any person having “a present or future beneficial interest in a
trust, vested or contingent,” without regard to the magnitude of that interest. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 103(3)(A) (2005). Accordingly, possessing even an extremely minimal or
extremely contingent interest in a trust makes one a “beneficiary” thereof.
166 I admit this argument is somewhat inconsistent with my prior argument that the
emerging rule is calculated to maximize beneficiaries’ wealth rather than serve their
other interests. See supra Part II.E. Certainly, a ban on investment in cigarette manufacturers does not directly serve the American Lung Association’s economic interests. Nevertheless, given the organization’s mission, I would expect a court to be extremely
sympathetic to a trust provision designed to keep this organization from investing in, and
profiting from, the manufacture and sale of such products.
167 See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note.
168 See, e.g., C. Shawn O’Donnell, Note, Exploring the Tennessee Uniform Trust
Code, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 489, 492-93 (2008) (observing that Tennessee customized its
version of the UTC).
169 Subject to certain limits, a settlor may invoke the law of a favored jurisdiction
merely by electing to do so in the governing trust document. See infra note 184. While
most lawyers utilize the law of the settlor’s domicile as a default measure, one source
argues that such an approach should be considered legal malpractice. See, Michael J.
Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic Development:
The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 662 (1999)
(advocating recognition of a cause of action for “Negligent Trust Situs”). These two
165
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are free to shop for the state law that best meets their needs, while state
legislatures are free to customize state trust law to attract wealthy settlors and profitable trust business.
State legislatures have shown a proclivity for implementing changes
that will attract trust business to their jurisdictions.170 Whether by repealing the rule against perpetuities,171 enhancing creditor protections,172 or eliminating disfavored taxes,173 state lawmakers have found
ways to lure the “great river of money”174 passing from one wealthy
generation to the next. Consistent with this history, state politicians
have already begun modifying or discarding unpopular provisions of the
UTC,175 precipitating yet another “race for the bottom”176 that will
likely lead some jurisdictions to legislatively reverse the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule.
This concern is far from idle speculation. Indeed, for example,
Ohio has already done just this, deleting the mandatory rule found in
UTC section 105(b)(3) and replacing the requirement in UTC section
404 that “[a] trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries,”177 with a more settlor-friendly provision that “[a] trust exists,
professors at the University of South Dakota define their proposed tort as follows: “To be
ignorant of the South Dakota environment, or the failure to inform clients of its advantages . . . .” Id.
170 See Dobris, supra note 160, at 574 (“[A]ny change . . . which leads to the loss of
trust business in big money center jurisdictions, will lead to amendments of local law in
those jurisdictions.”).
171 See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359,
412-14 (2005) (discussing how states attracted wealth by repealing the rule against
perpetuities).
172 See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1037-38 (2000) (discussing how several states have begun to compete for trust wealth by making it easier for settlors to protect trust assets from creditors).
173 See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern
Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 878-81 (2006) (discussing how states
attracted wealth by repealing state death taxes).
174 Dobris, supra note 160, at 561.
175 As one example, state legislatures adopting the UTC routinely have modified the
unpopular provisions requiring a trustee to keep trust beneficiaries informed regarding
trust matters. Gallanis, supra note 57, at 1597. Also, as of Gallanis’s writing, every state
but one had converted that mandatory rule into a default one. Id. at 1609. For a more
recent discussion of the same topic, see generally Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the
Remaindermen: The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 46 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 173 (2011).
176 The impact of interstate competition on state laws has been studied extensively in
the context of corporate law. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (using the term “race for the
bottom” to describe the states’ efforts to attract corporate business by adopting favorable
corporate laws).
177 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2005).
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and its assets shall be held, for the benefit of its beneficiaries in accordance with the interests of the beneficiaries in the trust.”178 The Joint
Committee recommending this Ohio modification did so with reference
to Professor Langbein’s 2004 essay in the Northwestern University Law
Review, expressly rejecting the emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule.179 Iowa similarly made a conscious choice not to include a
mandatory benefit-the-beneficiaries rule in its version of the trust
code.180 Georgia added a unique provision affirming the settlor’s
power to negate the duty to diversity.181 Most recently, New Hampshire
modified its version of the UTC to clarify that the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule shall be interpreted to effectuate the settlor’s intent rather
than defeat it.182 This legislative change is just one further step in New
Hampshire’s systematic effort to make the Granite State “the perfect
place for very wealthy people to park their cash.”183
As other state legislatures similarly pick apart the UTC to modify
unpopular provisions, trust settlors will be free to select the law of the
most favorable jurisdiction to govern their trust documents.184 The re178

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.04 (LexisNexis 2012).
Alan Newman, Report on HB 416: The Ohio Trust Code as Enacted (May 2006),
available at http://www.ohiobankersleague.com/pdf/hb416asenacted.pdf (citing Langbein,
Mandatory Rules, supra note 8, at 1109).
180 See Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust – Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last,
49 DRAKE L. REV. 165, 185 (2001) (discussing Iowa’s decision not to include any
mandatory rules in its trust code).
181 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-341(2) (2011) (“The trustee shall not be liable for failing
to comply with the duty [to diversify] . . . to the extent that the terms of the trust instrument limit or waive the duty.”)
182 New Hampshire Senate Bill 50 (S.B. 50, 2011 Sess. (N.H. 2011)), modified N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-112 as of September 11, 2011, to provide that, “[f]or the purposes of determining the benefit of the beneficiaries, the settlor’s intent as expressed in
the terms of the trust shall be paramount.” The bill similarly modified N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN §§ 564-B:1-105(b)(3) and 564-B:4-404 to reflect the primacy of settlor’s intent in
application of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule.
183 Amy Kanyuk, In New Hampshire We Trust, AROUND CONCORD, at 15, 16 (Winter 2007/2008). See also Denis Paiste, Banking on Trust, N.H. UNION LEADER, Nov. 7,
2010 (discussing New Hampshire’s efforts to attract and retain trust business); Joseph F.
McDonald, III, Migrating Trusts to New Hampshire: The “Why” and the “How,” N.H. B.
J., at 34 (Winter 2010) (discussing the mechanics of “migrating” an out-of-state trust to
New Hampshire).
184 UTC § 107 provides one hurdle for a settlor seeking to adopt the law of a
favorable jurisdiction. That section provides that a settlor’s choice of governing law controls unless “contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 (2005). This provision
creates another potential source of controversy insofar as a settlor seeking to avoid the
emerging rule could freely adopt the law of a more favorable jurisdiction unless the
emerging rule represents the state’s strong public policy of having the “most significant
relationship” to the trust. To the extent the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries have contacts with multiple states, protracted litigation might be necessary to determine (1) which
179
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sult will be a simple means of avoiding the impact of the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule as well as creation of the very patchwork of state laws
that uniform acts are intended to avoid.
D. The Avoidance of Trust Law
To this point, I have argued that trust settlors will find means within
trust law to avoid potential implications of the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule, either by altering the provisions of trust documents or ensuring
that those documents are overseen by compliant trustees or are governed by the laws of a settlor-friendly jurisdiction. There remains a final, more significant, possibility. Some trust settlors may abandon trust
law in its entirety, rejecting express trusts as estate planning devices in
favor of other forms of property ownership.
There are two predictable manners in which this might occur. One
is through increased utilization of undocumented, “secret” trusts rather
than formal ones. The other is through the use of other business entities, most likely limited partnerships or limited liability companies, as
the preferred vehicles for estate planning. Widespread use of these options could sound the death knell for trust law, as settlors simply abandon a legal regime that no longer serves their needs.
1. Informal Avoidance: Secret Trusts
The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule might lead to the return of a device rarely seen in modern estate planning: the secret trust.185 Returning to a prior example,186 assume the trust settlor seeking to
preserve a valuable vacation home for her children is unwilling to bear
the risk that her chosen trustee will sell that property to maximize the
trust’s economic return. If she believes formal trust law accords insufficient deference to her chosen course of conduct, she simply may avoid
that law. To do so, she could give the residence outright to her daughter, who is more emotionally attached to the house (and thus less likely
to ever sell it), with the undocumented understanding that the daughter
will share the house with her brother. Although the conveyance would
appear to be an outright one, in reality it would be a secret trust.
jurisdiction has the “most significant” nexus to the trust; and (2) whether the emerging
rule represents the “strong public policy” of that state. For a detailed exploration of
§ 107, see generally Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: Uniform Trust Code,
Sections 107 and 403, 67 MO. L. REV. 213 (2002).
185 A secret trust is a distribution of property which appears to be an outright bequest but is really founded upon the recipient’s express or implied promise to use the
property to benefit another. For a complete discussion, including extensive citations to
the case law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 18 (2003).
186 See supra Part II.E.1.
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Unfortunately the settlor’s seemingly simple approach leaves crucial questions unresolved. For example, who is to resolve controversies
between the siblings? What tax implications result from the ownership
and use of the residence? Who will plan for the use of the house by
future generations? And perhaps of greatest concern, what if the sister
in our example simply denies the existence of any obligation to her
brother and treats the property as solely her own?
The hypothetical settlor’s reliance on a secret trust thus is fraught
with peril, providing her chosen beneficiaries with neither the administrative framework nor the statutory protections afforded by formal trust
law. Albeit ill-advised, her response is a predictable one which provides
a simple means of avoiding a rule she considers unjust and inadvisable.187 Ironically, while the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is designed to
protect the brother in this example from his mother’s irrational vision, it
actually provides an incentive for her to disenfranchise him.
2.

Formal Avoidance: Choosing Other Entities

The investment goals of many trust settlors could be pursued
through various estate planning devices, only one of which is the trust.
Whether business188 or personal assets189 are involved, the trust competes as a form of ownership with other legal entities, including corporations, limited liability companies (“LLCs”) and limited partnerships
(“LPs”).190 Accordingly, a settlor seeking to arrange ownership of her
assets is free to select the structure of her choice and adopt the legal
regime that flows from that choice. For the settlor seeking to impose
enforceable investment restrictions, LLCs and LPs (hereinafter collec187

Some may contend this prediction is too extreme. My counter is that to the extent the proponents of the emerging rule suggest that many trust investment restrictions
are motivated by ego or self-aggrandizement rather than a true desire to benefit chosen
beneficiaries, they should expect to encounter trust settlors who will react as I have suggested. It would be disingenuous to simultaneously argue that we need a strong benefitthe-beneficiaries rule to protect us from legions of irrational, egotistical, overly-controlling settlors and then fail to concede that some of those settlors will look to secret trusts
as a means of negating the rule that seeks to constrain them.
188 For a comparison of trusts with other entities used in commercial transactions,
see, for example, Henry Hansmann et al., The New Business Entities in Evolutionary
Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 5-14 (2005); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the
Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 179 (1997); Robert H.
Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 35-48
(2004).
189 See Louis A. Mezzullo, Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, SJ0002 ALI-ABA 615 (2003) for a comparison of trusts with other entities used in
estate planning transactions.
190 In the estate planning context, limited partnerships often are referred to as family
limited partnerships (“FLPs”).
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tively referred to as “partnerships”) now may offer a more favorable
governing regime than does trust law.191
Like a trust, a partnership provides a mechanism to separate beneficial ownership of assets from daily management and control.192 However, a crucial distinction is that the investment decisions made by the
managing partner193 of a partnership are evaluated based on a “business
judgment” standard of conduct, a significantly more deferential standard than the “prudent investor” standard applicable to trustees.194 In
addition, the governing partnership agreement can be drafted to deter
and penalize any challenges to the managing partner’s investment decisions, such as by requiring those who bring unsuccessful claims against
the managing partner to pay all of the resulting legal expenses.195 Finally, a managing partner may have fewer “beneficiaries” to answer to
in the first place, since the trustee’s obligation to balance the investment
needs of current and future beneficiaries is inapplicable in the partnership context.196
Utilizing a partnership to bypass undesirable elements of trust law
would be a simple task for a modern estate planner. After drafting a
trust for her clients’ chosen beneficiaries, the lawyer would then add a
second layer into the estate plan, placing her client’s investment assets
into a partnership and funding the trust with partnership interests rather
191

See John F. Ramsbacher, The Family Limited Partnership/LLC – The Basic
Building Block, in 37TH ANNUAL ESTATE PLANNING INSTITUTE (PLI Tax Law & Est.
Plan., Course Handbook Series No. 8761, 2006), for a detailed analysis of the formation,
management, and uses of such entities in estate planning; David Tyler Lewis & Christopher J.C. Jones, Limited Liability Companies as Trust Substitutes, Part 2, 18 PROB. &
PROP., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 52-56 (exploring advantages of using LLCs rather than trusts in
estate planning).
192 Both LPs and LLCs provide a means to centralize management responsibility for
an entity. An LP has both “limited” and “general” partners, only the latter of which have
investment responsibility and managerial control. In a manager-managed LLC, one or
more members are designated as the “managers” and vested with administrative and
investment responsibility. The remaining members of the LLC are akin to limited partners and have no managerial control of the entity. J. William Callison, Venture Capital
and Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97, 108 (2000).
193 For convenience, I will use the term “managing partner” to refer generically to
both the managing partner of an LP and the managing member of an LLC.
194 S. Stacy Eastland, I.R.C. Section 2036 Defenses for the Family Limited Partnership
Technique, SM077 ALI-ABA 1271 (2007) (discussing, at section II(3)(h) of the cited material, the distinction in standards); Mezzullo, supra note 189, at 726 (“This lower standard will give comfort to the older family members that the younger family members will
not use 20/20 hindsight to challenge the investment decisions . . . .”).
195 See Eastland, supra note 194, at 1324.
196 Stanley Rosenberg & Sanford J. Schlesinger, The Benefits of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning and the Impact of “Anti-Abuse” and “Check-the-Box,” N.Y.
ST. B.J., 30, 33 (July-Aug. 1997).
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than the underlying assets. This two-step approach would shift investment responsibility for the underlying assets from the trustee to the
managing partner, who will make those decisions within the parameters
of partnership law.
With this proverbial stroke of the lawyer’s pen, trust investment law
becomes effectively irrelevant. As a mere limited partner, the trustee
has no power to impact the investment of the partnership’s underlying
assets. The only investment option available to the trustee would be to
sell the partnership interest itself. However, this is probably not a viable
option. In addition to the fact that the partnership agreement may restrict such a sale,197 there would be almost no market for an interest in
such an estate planning partnership. As a result, the trust’s interest in
such a partnership would trade at up to a fifty-percent discount to underlying market value,198 likely far too high a price for the trustee to pay
to regain investment control.
Due to their tax advantages and favorable legal regime, partnerships have already gained widespread acceptance in modern estate planning.199 The emerging benefit-the-beneficiaries rule might now add one
further jewel in the partnership’s crown, providing a simple mechanism
for avoiding the increasingly unfavorable requirements of trust law. As
a result, while the trust has historically been the estate planning device
of first resort, the partnership may soon assume that throne.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have explored two major themes. First, the benefitthe-beneficiaries rule can be read to materially alter key principles of
traditional trust law, creating significant complexities of statutory interpretation and precipitating a host of undesirable, likely unintended, consequences. Second, trust settlors and their counsel will respond to what
197 Mezzullo, supra note 189, at 645-46 (discussing specific restrictions on
transferability).
198 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships:
Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 649, 650 (2004) (estimating a discount of one-third to one-half of the underlying value of the assets); Milton
Childs, Using Family Limited Partnerships for Estate Planning, 5 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 193, 198 (2004) (estimating a discount of twenty percent to fifty percent). For a
detailed explanation of the applicable valuation discounts, including extensive mathematical computations, see generally Jay T. Brandi, Estate Tax Valuation and Comparative
Discounting for the Limited Liability Company Investment Fund, J. LEGAL ECON., 27
(Fall 2002). For a survey of recent case law relevant to the topic, see David Pratt, Update
on Use of Family Limited Partnerships and Discount Planning, SP037 ALI-ABA 399
(2009).
199 Carol Warnick, Family Limited Partnerships: Taxes, Courts, and an Uncertain Future – Part I, 33 COLO. LAW. 61, 61 (Mar. 2004) (“The family limited partnership (‘FLP’)
has ascended to the summit of favored estate planning techniques . . . .”).
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they perceive as an undesirable new statutory regime in predictable
ways that will serve merely to exacerbate current policy concerns about
dead-hand control of trust assets. Rather than counteracting the dead
hand control of trust assets, this emerging rule will force settlors towards
even more extreme behavior—seeking out the most settlor-friendly
trust jurisdictions and drafting the most favorable settlor-favorable trust
provisions. However well-intentioned it may be, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule thus undermines the very policy goals it was intended to
further.
The future, however, does not have to be this way. The time remains for judges and legislatures to restrict the rule’s application to only
the most egregious of cases, leaving unfettered the discretion accorded
to the vast majority of trust settlors. A trust law regime which honors
the intent of trust settlors can incorporate sufficient means to protect
trust beneficiaries from many misguided investment directives.200 It
cannot, however, wholly substitute its own judgment for that of trust
settlors and expect those settlors to simply yield to such dictates. Dead
hands will not so easily yield their power. Those who contend otherwise
must realize that they have picked a battle they simply cannot win.

200

I discuss this theme more fully in Cooper, Empty Promises, supra note 10, at
1210-15.

